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SHORT STORY

A poor carpenter loaned $4600 to a needy friend. The friend's
fortunes improved. Indeed, he became wealthy. When the poor man
asked him to repay the debt, instead of doing so with thanks, the rich
man went to a lawyer who advised him to plead the statute of limitations. The rich man did so, and the poor man was denied justice.
So goes the usual version of Zabella v. Pakel.' It has become an
important case in legal ethics, used primarily to illustrate the tension
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B.A. 1962, Northwestern University. J.D. 1965, University of Chicago Law School. This article
was delivered as the Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law at the University of Florida
College of Law on March 9, 1990. The author especially thanks Kathryn Boe Morgan, Betsy
Levin, and Nancy Schultz for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

between a client's legal rights and moral responsibilities. 2 We use it
here to focus our thinking on the ethics of lawyers in the context of
legal counseling.

II.

WHEN IS A LAWYER ACTING AS A COUNSELOR?

A major problem for lawyers thinking about counseling is that
there is little traditional structure for defining ethical questions that
lawyers face in that role. The drafters of the American Bar Association
(the ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model Code)
gave cursory treatment to the counseling function, 3 and authoritative
case law is sparse on many questions. 4 Counseling issues tend to arise
in the lawyer's office or in other contexts where no record is kept and
no judge oversees the lawyer's conduct. As lawyers, we have broad
aspirational guides, 5 but we are largely on our honor.
In this discussion, the term "counseling" refers primarily to a
lawyer acting to help a client deal with future circumstances or events.
This use of the term is not original. For example, the Model Code
distinguishes between a lawyer's roles as "advocate" and "adviser" as
follows:
In asserting a position on behalf of his client, an advocate
for the most part deals with past conduct and must take the
facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as

2. The case was used, for example, as an illustration in Postema, Moral Responsibility in
Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 66 (1980) (characterizing the activity as morally
dubious but legally sound). It was used again in Luban, Calming the HearseHorse: A Philosophical Research Programfor Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 456-57 (1981) (using the case as
an example of genuine conflict between ordinary morality and lawyers' role morality).
3. See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.2.1, at 689 (1986); Redmount,
Client Counseling and the Regulation of ProfessionalConduct, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 829, 844-45
(1982).
4. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, § 13.3.2-.8.2, at 693-751 (collecting extant case law).
5. Ethical Consideration 748, for example, provides:
A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative.
A lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-making process the fullness of
his experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In assisting his client to reach
a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which
may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible. He may
emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that might result from assertion
of legally permissible positions. In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should
always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives
or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for
himself.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (citations omitted).
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adviser primarily assists his client in determining the course
of future conduct and relationships.6
This distinction is fundamental because it recognizes that the key
fact about counseling is the ability of the lawyer and client to affect
events or at least ameliorate their effects. In this discussion, the term
"advocacy," then, refers primarily to the process of authoritatively
7
determining the legal consequences of past events.
III.

THE CURRENT PARADIGM FOR THINKING ABOUT LAWYERS
AS COUNSELORS

Despite the relative lack of case law and other legally authoritative
guidance - or perhaps because of that lack of authority - writers

6. Id. Commentators have also drawn this distinction. See L. BROWN & E.DAUER, PLAN-

at xix (1978); C.
supra note 3, § 13.2.1, at 689.
7. Such a distinction between advocacy and counseling is, of course, not precise. Resolution
of litigation can have future consequences, as where a lawyer obtains an injunction on the client's
behalf or even where the lawyer wins an acquittal that puts a dangerous criminal back on the
streets. Similarly, by my definition, when a lawyer helps a client decide whether to resort to
litigation - and later whether to cease doing so - the lawyer is involved in counseling.
Having drawn the basic distinction, concrete situations of lawyer counseling can then be
grouped into four categories. Again, the categories are not original. They provide the organizational structure for chapter 13 of C. WOLFRAM, supra note 3. The categories also tend to
parallel the structure of the ABA's Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS

WOLFRAM,

DUCT (1983).

The first category is the "advisor" role. See id. Rule 2.1. That role includes the lawyer's (1)
warning a client of the legal consequences of planned action, (2) helping the client plan what
action to take and to allocate the risks of such action among the parties to it, and (3)drafting
instruments to reflect the intentions of the client and third parties.
The second category is the role of 'intermediation," or bridging the differences between
clients. See id. Rule 2.2. This rule does not deal primarily with the usual meaning of mediation,
i.e., a way to resolve pre-existing differences between parties. Instead, it describes a way to
help clients reach common objectives while respecting the individual interests of each.
In the third category, lawyers play an important role in assuring third parties regarding
the accuracy of facts about the client or the situation. Model Rule 2.3 calls this function "evaluation" for third parties. Id. Rule 2.3.
In the fourth category, the lawyer often deals at arms length with third parties on the
client's behalf in a context that is sometimes called "negotiation." See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, supra
note 3, § 13.5, at 710. What distinguishes "counseling-type" negotiation from the negotiation of
a settlement to litigation is the fact that in counseling, the dealings are not primarily to sort
out the pieces of a past relationship. They are designed to keep a relationship together and
growing.
Of course, lawyers advise both individuals and organizations. The latter, however, present
special issues of confidentiality and responsibility that I will leave for another time.
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who view legal ethics f"om the perspective of moral philosophy often
have focused their concern on the lawyer's counseling function. s Although there is an obvious risk of oversimplification when one attempts
to summarize the work of several different writers into a few
categories, the following fairly represents what we will call the current
dominant paradigm for thinking about lawyers as counselors.
1. The general ethical standards of lawyers acting in their professional capacity fall inappropriately short of "ordinary morality," i.e.,
the moral standards to which persons generally should adhere.
2. The gap between professional and personal standards may be
tolerable in litigation, particularly criminal litigation, but the same
justifications do not apply to counseling. In counseling, ordinary morality should govern the lawyer's conduct.
3. A lawyer engaged in counseling should avoid categorical thinking such as reliance on rules of professional conduct, and should concentrate instead on helping to achieve individual and social justice in
each particular situation.
A.

The Difference Between Lawyer Ethics and "OrdinaryMorality"

Professors David Luban 9 and Richard Wasserstromo are two writers concerned about when or whether it is appropriate for persons to
act based on "role morality." That is, when may a lawyer do something
that common morality would say is improper for a nonlawyer to do?"
For example, may the lawyer who advised reliance on the statute of

8. I will be primarily relying here on the work of Professors Monroe Freedman, Charles
Fried, Geoffrey Hazard, Warren Lehman, David Luban, Gerald Postema, Robert Redmount,
Murray Schwartz, Thomas Shaffer, William Simon, and Richard Wasserstrom on this subject.
Articles and books of each will be cited at appropriate places hereafter.

9. See THE GOOD LAWYER 1-4
AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-47 (1989);

(D. Luban ed. 1983); D. LUBAN,
Luban, supra note 2, at 462-66.

LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:

10. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 5 (1975).
11. See Luban, supra note 2, at 456 ("A lawyer, then, may have a moral duty to assist in
an immoral case. How can this be true? Ordinarily, we think that no one is morally bound to
assist immorality. We may describe this as a conflict between ordinary morality and the role
morality of lawyers.") (emphasis in original); see also Part I: The Morality of Roles, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at 25-79; D. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 104-47; Postema, supra
note 2, at 73-81.
For one of the most vigorous objections to this formulation of the question, see Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060,
1066 (1976) ("I maintain that the traditional conception of the professional role expresses a
morally valid conception of human conduct and human relationships, that one who acts according
to that conception is to that extent a good person."). For an equally critical stance, see Hazard,
My Station as a Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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limitations in Zabella cite as a moral defense what Luban calls "the
adversary system excuse"?12
From Luban's perspective, at least in counseling situations, a
lawyer is morally responsible for the clients represented, the ends
sought, and the means used. "[W]hen professional and moral obligations conflict, the moral obligation takes precedence."'13
B.

The Difference Between Litigation and Counseling

Professor Murray Schwartz perhaps was the most effective commentator in establishing the current paradigm of the ethics of counseling.14 Schwartz identifled two principles that he deemed "necessary
to the effective working of the adversary system."' 15 These are: "[(1)
The] Principle of Professionalism, which obliges the lawyer within
professional constraints to maximize the likelihood that the client will
prevail, and [(2)] a Principle of Nonaccountability, which relieves the
advocate of legal, professional, and
moral accountability for proceeding
16
according to the first principle.'
Schwartz argued that the ethics of nonadvocate lawyers in "counseling" roles should not be governed by the same principles controlling
lawyers acting as advocates. First, the advocate must answer to an
impartial judge, 17 which is not true in counseling. Second, the Model
12. See Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 9, at
83. Luban viewed Zabella as a situation in which the lawyer technically complied with the terms
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility but Luban asserted that "[firom the point of
view of ordinary morality... it is wrong to assist someone in reneging on his legitimate debt."
Luban, supra note 2, at 456-57.
This same view of pleading the statute of limitations to avoid a just debt had been expressed
almost 150 years earlier by David Hoffman, a Baltimore lawyer and law teacher: "I will never
plead the Statute of Limitations, when based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is
conscious he owes the debt, and has no defence than the legal bar, he shall never make me a
partner in his knavery." D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, VOL. II, Resolution 12
(2d ed. 1836).
13. D. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 155. Luban argues that a person is justified in relying on
role morality if, and only if, the person "(1) justifies the institution by demonstrating its moral
goodness; (2) justifies the role by appealing to the structure of the institution; (3) justifies the
role obligations by showing that they are essential to the role; and (4) justifies the role act by
showing that the obligations require it." Id. at 131. In the course of an argument that largely
presupposes that the poor are unlikely to receive justice under the American legal system,
Luban makes clear that only "when [the obligations] don't conflict, [do] professional obligations
rule the day." Id. at 155.
14. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REv.
669 (1978).
15. Id. at 671.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
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Code provides far more ethical guidance to the legal advocate than to
the legal counselor. 18 Thus, Schwartz concluded, a lawyer acting as a
counselor should not continue to represent a client who wishes to
pursue unfair, unconscionable, or unjust means or ends, even if those
means or ends are not unlawful. 19
C.

Avoiding CategoricalThinking and Concentrating on Justice

In a recent article, :Professor William Simon builds upon the insights of Schwartz, Wasserstrom, and Luban. First, Simon takes
Luban's position even farther by stating affirmatively that "[t]he
lawyer should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to promote justice. ' ' 20 Legal assistance is a scarce resource, Simon observes, and
"some rights or interests are more important than others."21 He further
notes that legal counseling is an act that affects the distribution of
power and wealth in the country.2 Lawyers have both a right and an
obligation to make ethical decisions about what cases to take, what
ends to pursue, and what means to employ on behalf of each client.
Inherent in Simon's thesis is his challenge to the kind of "categorical" thinking about lawyers' behavior that is present in most of the
authoritative standards of legal ethics. Simon recalls an exchange between Geoffrey Hazard and Monroe Freedman disputing the obligation
of a lawyer to disclose certain information to the opposing counsel.

18. See id. at 679-80.
19. Id. at 679-80, 685-86. For a forceful criticism of this position, see Freedman, Personal
Responsibility in a ProfessionalSystem, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191 (1978).
20. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1988). Going
beyond Luban's touchstone of ordinary morality, Simon asserted that his own approach was
"grounded in the lawyer's professional commitments to legal values." Id. at 1113. Simon defined
"legal values" in this context as something different from a narrow reading of positive law, and
as including what the law ought to be. See id. at 1092. Compare Gordon, The Independence of
Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1988) (calling on lawyers to act with "independence" from their
clients' ends and to pursue justice as they see it) with Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me
That?": Attorney-Client DeliberationRegarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients,
68 N.C.L. REV. 213 (1990) (proposing that lawyers counsel clients on moral issues).
21. Simon, supra note 20, at 1092.
22. Id. at 1125.
Ethically-charged legal controversies are fundamentally distributive in the sense
that they involve conflicting goals of individuals. The critical implication of this
point for legal ethics is that the appeal to individual autonomy or right is not a
sufficient basis for client loyalty because it begs the question of why the client's
autonomy or right should be preferred to that of the person whose autonomy or
right is frustrated by the client's activities.
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Each posed a factually appealing case for his position, and Hazard
said, "You can't make these cases turn on the underlying merits. We
are talking about, in the fundamental sense, the procedural rule [to
apply in such cases]."2 Simon rejects that approach and asserts, "[T]he
central thrust of the approach defended in this [Simon's] essay is to
insist that the decision should often turn on 'the underlying merits.' "2
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM

Up to now, I have tried to sketch three important themes in the
current analysis of lawyer counseling. They are far from the only
things people have been saying,rs but they have been influential. In
what follows, I will challenge this analysis of the way lawyers should
approach counseling. To keep things parallel, I will organize the
analysis around the examination and defense of three positions of my
own.
1. The professional function of a lawyer is to assist
clients to comply with the law and to take appropriate advantage of lawful opportunities.
2. A lawyer should do no more harm to third parties
than is reasonably required to serve the legitimate interests
of the lawyer's client.
3. A lawyer's professional judgment and advice to a
client should reflect the empathy, respect, and practical wisdom that the lawyer would offer a good friend.
These ideas may seem self-evident to some; to others, they may
be more radical. In attempting to persuade the reader about each of
them, I will acknowledge that each idea reflects my effort to resolve
several debatable issues inherent in each proposition.
A.

Assisting Clients to Comply With the Law and Take Appropriate
Advantage of Its Opportunities

I start my proposed reformulation of the current paradigm here
because I believe that lawyers need not apologize for most of what

23. Id. at 1089 (citing A Gathering of Legal Scholarsto Discuss "ProfessionalResponsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct," 35 U. Mmi I L. REV. 639, 654 (1981)).
24.

Id. at 1090.

25. See, e.g., D.

BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:

CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 5

A

(1977) (" 'Counseling,' as used in this book, refers to a process

in which lawyers help clients reach decisions."). The writers have placed their emphasis on the
role of the lawyer in assuring the autonomy and independence of the client. Id.
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they do for clients. Unlike Schwartz, Wasserstrom, Luban, and Simon,
I believe that arguing that the ethics of the counseling process are
based on a misapplied faith in the adversary ideal is neither helpful
nor accurate. Indeed, I believe it is important to reaffirm the legal
and moral propriety of furthering a client's individual interests.
The general principles involved should be seen to be the same
principles of loyalty, care, integrity, and discretion that underlie the
relation between principal and agent. 26 What Schwartz and Luban call
principles of the adversary system ate merely subsets of the larger
principle that lawyers serve a necessary and proper role when they
help individuals work through the legal issues constantly confronting
them in today's complex society.
Threats to personal and financial safety are an inherent part of
life for most people. As Monroe Freedman put it, "[M]y client has
come to me because he or she is suffering in some way or, at least,
is trying to avoid suffering.' 27 In as common an event as drafting a
will, a lawyer deals with a client who faces the certainty of personal
death. In both tax planning and real estate counseling, the client has
an end in view but needs help traversing what often seems like a
minefield in between.2
Indeed, honoring the lawyer's attention to the individual client is
even more vital in counseling than in litigation. For example, a client
who thinks about opening a new business will confront potentially
dozens of options and hundreds of issues. In contrast, when the problem is litigating the issue of who should pay whom after a completed
transaction, all the facts are history. In planning and counseling generally, there may be more parties with whom to deal, more uncertainty
about the facts and law, and a greater range of possible consequences
of each decision. While generalities about these matters are difficult,
the underlying point is that clients do not necessarily face high stakes
only when they are enmeshed in civil or criminal litigation.
Much of the legal counseling literature conveys a sense that the
objectives of individual clients often do not deserve much respect. The

26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958).
27. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH.U.L. REV. 331,331 (1987).
28. See Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REV. 963, 966-67
(1987). Professor Thomas Shaffer has raised the provocative issue whether the "client" should
always be defined as the individual who appears before the lawyer, or whether the "client"
should be defined more broadly as a group of persons who help give the individual a personal
identity and who are affected by what the individual does. Id. at 972; see also Simon, Homo
Psychologicus: Notes on a Neu' Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980) (reflecting
similar notions).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss3/2

8

Morgan: Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors
DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

effort to avoid an honest debt, illustrated by Zabella v. Pakel, is used
as a classic case. My intuition and experience, however, is that clients'
dishonest pursuit of personal gain is by no means the dominant case.
Typically, a lawyer's counseling function involves furthering the personal interests of a reasonably honest client who is dealing with other
reasonably honest people, all of whom see the world and their own
advantage differently. The practical moral question typically is not
whether a lawyer may counsel a bad client in dealing with good third
parties. Rather, the question is whether a lawyer may counsel a client
who is furthering his or her own interest in preference to the interests
of other people. I believe that the lawyer ordinarily may do so.
In the language of current moral theory, what I am defending is
sometimes described as "client autonomy." Some view the enhancement of this autonomy as one of the principal functions of a lawyer.29
However, I do not like the concept of "autonomy." Autonomy, when
perceived as a state of isolation or lack of connection with family and
others is neither realistic nor a value to be encouraged. None of us
should see ourselves as truly autonomous. We were born into families
and nurtured by communities. As a result, we owe obligations to those
individuals and groups, as well as to the broader society.30 But lawyers
and clients also experience repeated occasions in their lives for choices
and judgments that, while made after consultation, ultimately are
made alone. In that sense, each of us is autonomous.
One might next object to my reliance on civil and criminal law as
establishing the guides for lawyer behavior. One might indeed assert
that the law itself has no moral significance. Indeed, moral
philosophers have debated at length whether a moral duty to obey
the law exists31 Certainly, I must concede that this country's history
provides many instances that illustrate the misuse of law. The institution of slavery in the last centuryr and the continuing struggle for

29. E.g., Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 613, 613.
30. See, e.g., Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 0HIO ST. L.J. 703, 705 (1988);
Shaffer, supra note 28, at 969-71.
31. E.g., D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 23-24 (1984); Symposium, The Duty
to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 727 (1984); see Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms,
17 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 3, 15 (1983). Among the hardest problems for the principle that
the law has moral authority, of course, is the problem of obsolete statutes. There surely are
times when moral force no longer inheres in some to laws that remain on the books. See C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 702-03.
32. E.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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civil rights3 provide too many stories of law in the service of immoral
ends to be sanguine about the correlation between law and morality.
Indeed, law will probably continue to lag behind the most sensitive
moral understandings of each new generation. The ultimate moral
stature of law need not be established, however, to assert that law
tends to be the best human institution we have for guiding the lawyer's
moral instincts.
Although common experience indicates that many individual laws
are far from ideal, the question one always has to ask is "compared
to what?" Surely the general body of law provides a significantly
better guide to moral conduct than something such as Luban's "ordinary morality." Each of us is a part of multiple groups with many
and differing degrees of moral influence affecting us. We are not likely
to agree on much more than law as a common source of moral influence.3 We can aspire to universal moral principles, but we are lucky
if we can do more than muddle through. Law provides a guide through
the moral ambiguity inherent in so many cases.
In Zabella, using the statute of limitations to avoid a just debt
may seem to demonstrate that law and morality are hopelessly disconnected.3 5 A closer examination of the facts, however, does not support
that conclusion.
John Pakel apparently had been a small-time contractor in the
1920s. Joseph Zabella had worked for him as a carpenter. On several
occasions, Zabella was in a better financial position than Pakel and
loaned him money. When the depression hit, Pakel's fortunes further
declined. On December 28, 1929, shortly after the stock market crash,
Pakel executed deeds to Zabella on three pieces of property, including
36
a deed to Pakel's own house.
Pakel did not tell Zabella what he had done. We don't know why.
Perhaps Pakel was silent because he had deeded away his own house.
Perhaps Pakel had hoped to have Zabella deed the property back to
him later, or even hoped the deeds were ineffective because they were
never delivered. Whatever the reason, Pakel did, in fact, record the

33. E.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). See generally T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-1963 (1988).
34. See Hazard, CommunitarianEthics and Legal Justification,59 COLO. L. REV. 721,
733 (1988); see also Hazard, supra note 11, at 16 ("the legal code is merely a subset of the
relativist ethics by which everyone must conduct everyday life").
35. See Zabella, 242 F.2d at 454.
36. Id. at 453.
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deeds, and Zabella became the record owner of the property. Further,
Pakel later treated Zabella as the owner.Y
On September 1, 1931, Pakel executed a note to Zabella for $4577,
which represented all the prior loans plus interest to date. Pakel did
not deduct the value of the earlier conveyances. In 1937 Pakel declared
bankruptcy. His debts, including the $4577 note, were discharged.
The conveyances to Zabella, however, were not set aside.
Now the story jumps ahead fifteen years. After the bankruptcy,
Pakel had ceased his entrepreneurial efforts and had taken salaried
work. No thanks to Zabella, Pakel had risen to the presidency of a
significant Chicago savings and loan association.
In 1952 a man named Gaw decided he wanted to buy one of the
three parcels Pakel had conveyed to Zabella back in 1929. Gaw went
to Pakel, who told Gaw that he had lost track of Zabella, but he gave
Gaw a lead as to where Zabella might be. Gaw found Zabella and
they agreed on a price for the parcel. Zabella then contacted Pakel
and asked how he had come to own the land. Pakel explained and
gave Zabella the deeds to the other two parcels as well 9 Two years
passed. One day Pakel received notice that Zabella had obtained a
judgment on the cognovit note 4o Pakel had executed twenty-three
years earlier. Nothing in the facts indicates that Zabella even had the
decency to call Pakel before proceeding on the note.
Moral philosophers criticize Pakel's lawyer's advice to plead the
statute of limitations, but what would you have done? Your client's
debt had been completely discharged in a bankruptcy that was in no
sense fraudulent and was designed to give him a fresh start. Your
client had executed deeds to his friend although he was not required
to do so. Finally, your client had even made Zabella aware of the
chance to sell the land.
In Zabella, the statute of limitations issue only arose because of
Zabella's assertion that, by delivering the deeds in 1952, Pakel had
implicitly assumed anew the obligation to pay the original debt. 41 A
37. Id. at 454.
38. Id. at 453.
39. 242 F.2d at 453-54.
40. A cognovit note is defined as "[a)n extraordinary note which authorizes an attorney to
confess judgment against person or persons signing it. It is written authority of a debtor and
a direction by him for entry of a judgment against him if obligation set forth in note is not paid
when due." BLACK'S LAW DIOTIONARY 236 (5th ed. 1979).
41. See Zabella, 242 F.2d at 455. Zabella also testified that at the time Pakel gave him
the deeds, Pakel also said that he was living on his salary, had few savings, and could not
immediately repay the debt. If his circumstances changed, however, Pakel allegedly left open
the possibility of repaying Zabella something. The court found such an indefinite promise to be
insufficient under Illinois law to renew the original obligation. Id.
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jury accepted that story and awarded Zabella $10,494 in principal and
interest. 42 In the face of what must have seemed to his client an unjust
characterization of the facts, Pakel's lawyer relied on an Illinois statute
which provided that any new agreement relating to a debt barred by
the statute of limitations had to be in writing. Because the "new
agreement" was not in writing, the court set aside the judgment
against Pakel.
I do not tell the story at such length to cite Pakel's lawyer as a
moral exemplar. Rather, I provide this background to suggest that I
believe the moral ambiguity in most contested matters is far greater
than advocates of subordinating law to morality often admit. Indeed,
I believe Zabella came out about right - morally as well as legally.
Of course, Pakel might have voluntarily paid Zabella the $4577, or
even the $10,494. That would have been a gracious act, or in theological
terms, an act of grace. 43 Christians who understand that the source
of their own lives and salvation flows from the grace of God feel
compelled to offer acts of grace to those with whom they deal. Although
that belief is an important source of moral insight, however, I hesitate
to identify it today as either Luban's "ordinary morality" or Simon's
"legal values," and to say that it must define a lawyer's proper role.
Pakel's lawyer properly could have concluded that his client had
gone out of his way to help a man who was unforgiving, ungrateful,
and even spiteful. He advised Pakel of his rights under the law and
helped him to assert them. For this, Pakel's lawyer deserves no condemnation. He relied on his client's right to a new start given by the
discharge in bankruptcy and on the requirement of a writing to avoid
a swearing battle between his client and Zabella. May each of us do
as well.
B.

No More Harm to Third Parties Than Serving the Client's
Legitimate Interests

Despite the general propriety of loyally pursuing a client's interest,
however, lawyers must recognize that there are limits to measures
that they may undertake on a client's behalf. Too often, proponents
of the current paradigm tend to ignore the fact that such limits already

42. Id. at 453.
43. The theological dimensions of legal ethics are developed nowhere better than in the
work of Professor Thomas Shaffer. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A
LAWYER (1981). An important willingness to examine ethical questions from a theological stance
is also reflected in Cramton, The OrdinaryReligion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC.

247 (1978).
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clearly exist. Indeed, it is clearly wrong to suggest that even the
conduct of today's advocates is not limited. For example, a lawyer
may not bring a frivolous case,- use false evidence, 45 make a false
statement of law or fact to a tribunal or third party, 46 or conceal
material required to be disclosed by a discovery order or similar ob47
ligation.

The same kinds of limits apply to counseling as well. Model Rule
1.2(d), for example, provides: "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent. . .

."4

The cases agree that the rule flatly prohibits a

lawyer from assisting a client in criminal or unlawful activity. 49 The
real problem is where to draw any further line as to what a lawyer
may not do. As suggested earlier, one important approach is not to
draw a categorical line at all. Much of Thomas Shaffer's work suggests
this approach,w and William Simon's work explicitly advocates it.51

There is much to be said for such an approach to ethics - one that
stresses developing the character of individual lawyers rather than
honing their ability to find loopholes in ethical proscriptions. 52
On the other hand, authoritative statements of ethical standards
in lawyer codes and case law serve an important function. They constitute at least the best consensus that we have articulated about the
appropriate resolution of necessarily multi-faceted problems. No such

44. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983); see also FED. R. Civ.
P. 11; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1980).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4), (6) (1980).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1(a) (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980).
47. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1980).
48. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983). The counterpart in
the Model Code is Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980).
49. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 692-706; see also Hazard, How FarMay a Lawyer
Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981).
50. Professor Shaffer is a master at teaching about moral behavior through the use of
biography and stories that come close to achieving the status of parables. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER,
AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS 471-72 (1985); T.
SHAFFER, supra note 43; Shaffer, A Lesson From Trollopefor Counselors at Law, 35 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 727 (1978) [hereinafter A Lesson From Trollope].
51. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
52. Other important articles on the development of lawyer character include Crainton,
Beyond the OrdinaryReligion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987); Cramton, supranote 43; Eisele,
Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495 (1987).
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rules can be applied uncritically to particular cases. Further, anytime
rules are drafted and adopted by a self-interested group such as a bar
association, a substantial likelihood exists that others will believe they
could have come up with better propositions.- On the other hand,
careful attention to ethical rules and the concerns that they reflect is
likely to play a critical role in regulating the behavior of even people
of character. 54
Beyond the prohibition against assisting crime or fraud, a lawyer
clearly cannot be absolutely precluded from harming the client's opponent. Almost by definition, what the lawyer does for the client will
be partly at someone else's expense. Certainly that was true in
Zabella, for example. Even if the action of a lawyer makes everyone
better off, it often will improve the client's position more than others.
An absence of harm to others, then, cannot be the test.
Similarly, it cannot be enough merely to bar a lawyer from taking
"action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious
that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another. ' 55 The occasions on which legal action will have absolutely
no purpose other than injury to a third party are rare. Surely professionally responsible practice requires more sensitivity to the interests
of third parties than that.
In fact, of course, both the Model Code and the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (the Model Rules) have quite specific limits
on what a lawyer may do on a client's behalf. Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A)
of the Model Code, for example, forbids a lawyer from threatening
criminal charges to gain leverage in a civil case. The rule is derived
directly from statutory and common law limits on extortion. Similarly, the lawyer's duty not to lie, even in negotiations, is longstanding,

53. See, e.g., Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 702, 704 (1977); Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A FunctionalPerspectiveon Professional
Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 691 (1981).
54. See generally Davis, The Moral Authority of a Professional Code, in AUTHORITY
REVISITED: NOMOS XXIX 302 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1987) (investigating the moral
authority of professional codes).
55. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980). The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct are not much better than the Model Code. Rule 4.4 forbids only
"means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 (1983). "No substantial purpose
other than to embarrass" may be a higher standard than "action merely to harass," but neither
standard is a call to honor or even to integrity.
56. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1980); see also C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 716-18.
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a.iough its exact scope and bounds are not precise. 57 Further, the
A3A Code and Model Rules impose special duties on lawyers in their
dealings with unrepresented persons.m
The case law is also consistent with the view that a lawyer must
respect the interests of third parties. For example, the law gives third
parties the right to rely on facts that the lawyer purports to have
investigated and subsequently reports to the third parties. 59 An example is the title opinion, which in some parts of the country is rendered
by one attorney but relied upon by the lender and all interested parties.
The sale of securities or the closing of corporate loans often requires
similar certifications from attorneys.60
Specific standards tend to be preferable to imposing broad, vague
obligations on a lawyer dealing with third parties. When the Model
Rules were under consideration, for example, Rule 4.2 originally required a lawyer to be "fair" in such dealings. 6 1 That proposal certainly
would be consistent with the Schwartz, Luban, and Simon views, and
it is hard for anyone to be against fairness.
This formulation of the rule, however, reflects an unjustified arrogance that we can know enough about the interests of all parties to
know justice and fairness when we see it. I do not speak here of our
knowledge or lack of it as to when our client is lying. That is hard
enough to know but we at least have talked to our clients and investigated the facts of each story. We typically will not have had similar
conversations with the other parties to ongoing dealings. Knowing
enough about these other parties' needs and situations to guarantee
real "fairness" is too much to ask. Further, a "fairness" rule of ethics
would likely soon become a rule of liability to third parties when the
advised conduct is in the client's, but not the third parties', best
interest.

57. Model Rule 4.1 echoes Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5) of the Model Code. The Model
Rule states: "In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(a) (1983). However, the typical expectation of posturing, the distinction between
fact and opinion, and the obligation to correct third party misapprehensions are acknowledged
expressly in Model Rule 4.1(b) and the Comments to Rule 4.1. Id. Rule 4.1 comment. See also
White, Machiavelliand the Bar: EthicalLimits on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 926.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1980).
59. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 709-10; Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be

Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C.L. REV. 181, 182 (1981).
60. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 709-10.
61. See Hazard, supra note 59, at 191-95.
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The standard I propose is that the lawyer should refuse to engage
in conduct when the resulting harm to third parties will be more th
is necessary to further the client's legitimate concerns. This standart
clearly expects the lawyer to exercise broad judgment and discretion,
but it recognizes both that the client has legitimate concerns and that
the lawyer should limit representation to protecting those concerns.
In applying this standard, action principally intended to vindicate a
client's desire for revenge typically would be beyond the scope of
proper representation because revenge typically would not be a legitimate interest of the client. Similarly, otherwise proper action that
would put the opponent or a third party out of business ordinarily
would be excessive and thus improper unless the client's interest is
of comparable significance.
Stating the principle as generally as I have only reinforces the
desirability of relying principally on more specific rules. My residual
category would seem to pick up, however, cases like Spaulding v.
Zimmerman.62 There, in the course of a physical examination of the
plaintiff by the defendant's doctor, the doctor discovered that the
plaintiff had an aneurism that his own doctor had overlooked.6 Although no one could be sure whether the accident caused the aneurism,
thereby increasing the defendant's exposure for damages, the medical
personnel could be sure that the condition was life threatening.
The question arose in the context of litigation, but its resolution
involved counseling. Where potential harm to the third party clearly
is disproportionate to harm to the client, a lawyer should try to find
a way to permit a doctor to disclose the findings to the plaintiff.
On the other hand, protecting the client's legitimate interests insofar as that can be done is essential. For example, it might be possible
for the defense lawyer to negotiate a "use immunity" for the information. The lawyer would make the disclosure after a negotiated agreement that it would not be admissible at trial. The object, in short,
would be to get the plaintiff the necessary surgery to repair the
aneurism, but to do so in a way that protects the lawyers own client
insofar as possible.
In real life, of course, agreements or use of such disclosures may
be hard to obtain. Indeed, the time required for negotiation may itself
be life threatening. Arid, in a case like Spaulding where the issue
was settling the case, not trying it, one could not require the plaintiff's
negotiator to forget what he had heard. In less extreme cases, how-

62.
63.

263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
Id. at 349, 116 N.W.2d at 707.
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ever, particularly where the parties will have an ongoing course of

dealing, disclosure probably will be good- practice as well as good
ethics.
C.

Dealing With a Client as One Would With a Good Friend

I have been cautious in specifying how the lawyer should seek to

accommodate my first two propositions. They point, after all, in quite
different directions. First, a lawyer should assist the client in taking
advantage of opportunities the law creates. Second, and somewhat
conversely, a lawyer should not harm third parties any more than
necessary to serve the client's needs. The way to resolve this apparent

conflict as well as deal with a series of problems that fall in between,
requires a third proposition. This third rule urges a lawyer to deal

with a client as one would deal with a good friend.
The tension surrounding the decisionmaking process in the lawyer-

client relationship is usually analyzed in terms of the client's ultimate
control over the situation.6 At the least, the lawyer must inform the
client regarding what the lawyer is and is not doing for the client, so
that the client may decide to proceed alone or to seek other legal
advice.65 Of course, the client is always in control, if only because the

client can always fire the lawyer. But the lawyer's right to withdraw6

and the lack of an obligation to assist in odious conduct 67 reinforce the

64. D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 7 (1974). In the best
systematic study of the subject, Douglas Rosenthal distinguished between two views of the
relative authority of lawyer and client.
The traditional idea is that both parties are best served by the professional's
assuming broad control over solutions to the problems brought by the client. The
contradictory view is that both client and consultant gain from a sharing of control
over many of the decisions arising out of the relationship.

Id.
65.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983). The rule states:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of represen-

tation... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer
of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether
to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
Id. Model Rule 1.2 (e) continues: "When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not
permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the
client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct." Id. Rule 1.2 (e).
66. Id. Rule 1.16 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110
(1980).
67. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) (1980).
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idea that the decision to represent a client is an act with moral consequences and implications.
Traditionally, accommodating my first two propositions has been
seen as a problem of whether a lawyer may give moral and practical
advice along with legal advice. The standard answer has been a grudging yes, with the caveat that no client is required to give heed to the
lawyer's moral counsel.6 While the lawyer ultimately may not force
a client to do anything, moral advice simply cannot be optional in
client counseling. Indeed, in some cases, the failure to give moral
advice may approach malpractice. The comment to Model Rule 2.1
points out: "Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little
value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as
cost or effects on other people, are predominant . . . . [M]oral and
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may de''
cisively influence how the law will be applied. 69
One reason we tend to discount the possibility of lawyers actively
raising moral issues is that we think of lawyers as agents of their
clients. This lawyer-as-agent view, of course, is both correct and important. Where we go wrong is in our superficial belief that agents
are meant to be passive figures with neither personal judgment nor
moral sense.
Companies send agents all over the world. They entrust their company's good name and future prospects to these agents and often
permit them to take risks that threaten their company's viability.
Calling somebody an agent does not relegate him or her to the status
of an automaton. True, a principal has a right to "control" an agent
in the sense that the principal establishes the purpose of the agent's
action. 70 Further, the agent may not act contrary to the principal's
explicit direction. 71 But "[t]he control of the principal . . . may be
very attenuated and, as where the principal is physically absent, may
be ineffective."72 The right of the client-principal to "control" the

68. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983). The rule provides: "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render
candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (advice of lawyer
to client need not be confined to purely legal considerations).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 2.1 comment (1983). The point
was made earlier in Probert, The Jurisprudenceof a Good Lawyer, 2 J. LEGAL PROF. 37, 42,
46 (1977).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14, comment a (1958).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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lawyer certainly does not limit the lawyer-agent's right to talk back
and to try to persuade the client-principal to reduce the harm inflicted
on both the opponent and third parties.
My image of the lawyer as friend, of course, is only a metaphor.
It is far from adequate to capture the subtleties of the lawyer-client
relationship, but modern language is much richer in language about
individuality than about relationships, so it will have to do.
Further, the friend metaphor is not original nor does it have a
noncontroversial history. The term is associated most with Professor
Charles Fried's 1976 articleR that sought to make a different point.
Professor Fried was seeking to defend the advocate's practice of devoting full attention and loyalty to the client. He asserted that such
attention and loyalty are morally analogous to what one friend properly
would show another. 74 Critics have properly objected that the lawyerclient relationship is not in fact a relationship of friends. The lawyer
accepts clients far more casually and in more profusion than people
build friendships that would justify the special care which Fried contemplated.7 5
My use of the "client as a friend" metaphor may be subject to
some of the same criticism. However, I use the idea in a more limited
sense to describe a mental image rather than to provide a formal
philosophical justification for favoring one's client over others. That
is, I suggest that a lawyer's behavior is proper when the client is
given the kind of attention and empathy that one would give a good
friend.
Of course, the idea of a "good friend" may not mean the same
thing to everyone.76 Today, the term "friend" may apply to people
toward whom the speaker is favorably disposed but whom the speaker
hardly knows. Others may have such an emotional bond with persons
they consider their friends that they could not maintain sufficient
distance to render professional services at all.
As I use the term "good friend," I mean to suggest at least three
features of an appropriate relationship between lawyer and client.
First, one good friend tends to see another as a complete person with
aspirations and needs beyond those presented by merely technical
issues. A lawyer may not have the skill or wisdom to address all a

73.
74.
75.
578-79
76.

Fried, supra note 11, at 1060.
Id. at 1065-67.
See, e.g., Dauer & Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573,
(1977).
See A Lesson From Trollope, supra note 50, at 733-35. Professor Thomas Shaffer

thoughtfully examines the idea of the counselor acting as a friend. Id.
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client's needs, but the reality of those needs must be recognized within
the professional dealings. Second, a good friend tends to think in terms
of a long-term relationship, not a casual one. Any lawyer knows that
a client may come in only once and never return, but a lawyer should
respond to each client as if the long-term consequences of each matter
are important to both lawyer and client. Third, a good friend tends
to recognize that, while the relationship must affirm the friend's ultimate worth, appropriate candor and toughness on some issues are
both essential and expected. Candor should not be confused with insensitivity. Although honesty can sometimes damage or end a friendship,
typically it does neither. Sometimes only a good friend can effectively
tell another what needs to be said. Often, a lawyer must be that friend.
Thus when I speak of the lawyer acting as the client's "good friend,"
I do not suggest that the moral rules are thereby suspended. Indeed,
surely Fried is wrong to suggest that a good friend makes excuses
for another.- When you or I take a problem to a friend, we do so
because we value that friend's judgment. We want advice on what to
do. We do not want to be preached at, and we do not want to be
manipulated. We would not consider ourselves well advised, however,
if our friends failed to consider the moral as well as any other dimensions of our problem. 78
What I am suggesting is also different from what has been called
"preemptive counseling." 79 There are many different ways to advise
someone. Even when presenting options in a neutral manner, a lawyer
inevitably will make judgments, such as the judgment not to suggest
fraudulent or criminal behavior. Giving the client less than the full
range of lawful possibilities helps the lawyer limit the possibility that
the client will act reprehensibly. In extreme cases, some seem to
suggest giving only this limited counsel.- My own view, however, is

77. Fried, supra note 11, at 1065-67.
78. See Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231,
231-32 (1979). Professor Shaffer describes the lawyer as prepared to engage in a "moral conversation" with the client. Id.; see also Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U.L.
REV. 319, 319 (1987) (legal ethics frequently involve the attorney in discussions concerning how
to approach a client's morals). Professor Warren Lehman calls the interaction of lawyer and
client a "moral event." Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078,
1079 (1979). Each of these is only a label, but they point to the right issues.
79. The position is proposed in G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 147-49
(1978). Whether Professor Hazard would take exactly the same position today is unclear, but
the idea is heard sufficiently often that it is worth consideration here.
80. Indeed, Professor Hazard suggests that because a lawyer has the capability of giving
such advice, the lawyer may be morally responsible for the failure to do so. Id. at 149.
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that this approach represents a tempting, but largely indefensible,
shortcut. One can be as dishonest by withholding relevant information
as by asserting misinformation. In isolated instances, lying may be a
proper way to serve a higher good,8 1 but friends tend to deal with
more candor. If a lawyer truly cannot participate in the client's proposed strategy, the lawyer's only real course is to say so and offer to
resign, recognizing that at least sometimes the client will accept the
offer.
The thought that a lawyer should give a client the kind of candid,
tough advice which the lawyer would give a good friend may seem
radical or unnatural. Any other approach, however, may be less natural. The personalities of both lawyer and client inevitably enter into
any relationship.Y Although most people want to be liked and therefore
avoid frank confrontations with others, the failure to speak honestly
is a personal choice. For people with normal personal character, honest
dealing tends to "feel right." In the lawyer-client scenario, then, I am
suggesting that the lawyer should do what ordinarily will come naturally.
V.

CONCLUSION

All of the situations discussed deal with individual lawyers counseling individual clients. The problems of counseling corporations or other
organizations necessarily are different in important ways. Most obviously, a lawyer may counsel only individual agents of the organization. 3 If those agents feel no personal sense of moral responsibility
for the actions of the organization, the kind of counsel described here
may be less effective. Counseling questions such as these must be
saved for another day. When all is said and done as to the questions4
considered here, my bottom line is not much different from Luban's.
I have, however, arrived at the result from a different direction.

81.

See generally S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICES

IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE

(1978).

For example, we all like to think we would have lied to the Nazis about the Jews hidden in
our basements.
82. See, e.g., A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 4 (1978); Redmount, Attorney
Personalitiesand Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 972,
983 (1961); Redmount, Client Counseling and the Regulation of Professional Conduct, 26 ST.
LouIs U.L.J. 829, 849 (1982); see also Lehman, supra note 78, at 1080 ('Whatever the lawyer
does, he cannot be simply an instrument but is inevitably a party.").
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983).
84. See D. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 157. Luban, for example, calls for restrictions on four
kinds of conduct.
(1) on modes of practice that inflict morally unjustifiable damage on other people,
especially innocent people; (2) on deceit, i.e., actions that obscure truths or that
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First, we should acknowledge that the moral tension created when
lawyers serve the interests of particular clients is less than is currently
perceived. Being a lawyer is not inherently inconsistent with living a
moral life.
Next, lawyers should work as actively for the interests of their
clients as the law and professional standards permit. But when client
objectives or particular requests present moral issues, lawyers should
address those issues as directly and as frankly as any other questions
raised by the situation.
Finally, lawyers should advise clients as if those clients were good
friends. If asked to do more harm to an opponent or third party than
a client's legitimate interests require, a lawyer should refuse and try
to persuade the client to adopt another course. In doing so, the lawyer
must recognize the risk of losing the client or being forced to withdraw
as counsel. The lawyer should take those risks.
Are these standards morally responsible? Ultimately the reader
must decide, but I believe that they are. Will adherence to this view
of counseling be easy? Whoever promised life would be easy!

lure people into doing business under misapprehensions, even if these are legally
permissible; (3) on manipulations of morally defensible law to achieve outcomes
that negate its generality or violate its spirit; and in general, (4) on the pursuit
of substantively unjust results.
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